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Abstract We study household formation in a model where collective consumption
decisions of a household depend on the strategic choices of its members. The sur-
plus of households is determined by individual choices of levels of friendliness to
each other. A strategic conflict arises from a coupling condition that ceteris paribus, a
person’s friendlier attitude reduces the individual’s influence in the household’s col-
lective decision on how to divide the ensuing surplus. While partners in an isolated
household choose the minimum level of friendliness, competition for partners tends
to promote friendliness. We find that affluence does not buy affection, but can lead to
withholding of affection by an affluent partner who can afford to do so. In general, the
equilibrium degree of friendliness proves sensitive to the socio-economic composition
of the population.
Keywords Friendliness · Social equilibrium model · Household formation ·
Coupling condition · Competition for partners
JEL Classification C70 · D70
We would like to thank Clive Bell, Edward Glaeser, Roger Lagunoff, Eva Terberger and seminar
audiences in Berlin, Birmingham, Blacksburg, Exeter, Heidelberg, Manchester and at IHS in Vienna for
helpful comments. We greatly appreciate the thoughtful comments of a referee.
H. Gersbach (B)
CER-ETH—Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Zürichbergstrasse 18,
8092 Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: hgersbach@ethz.ch
H. Haller
Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316, USA
e-mail: haller@vt.edu
123
390 H. Gersbach, H. Haller
1 Introduction
Household formation ranks among the most important decisions a person ever makes.
Besides, decision making within the household is a very important recurrent activity
for most people. To a varying degree, they seek and find emotional comfort, social
identity and material gain in marriage and other socio-economic partnerships. In the
current paper, we study household formation and household stability, with the empha-
sis on two-person partnerships or households and the endogenous choice of personal
attributes.
In the typical model of a multi-person household, the welfare of a household mem-
ber may depend on the composition of the household and the individual consumption of
every household member.1 Such a model allows for consumption externalities within
a household. It can also accommodate local public goods via intra-household exter-
nalities by having individual welfare solely depend on the aggregate consumption of
the good within the household. The model further accommodates pure group externa-
lities, that is instances where the identity and personal attributes of fellow household
members matter to an individual.
Undoubtedly, there are personal traits over which an individual has some control and
which affect others. Our initial motivation for this study stems from the fact that despite
its potential descriptive richness, the typical model of a multi-member household rules
out the possibility of deliberately chosen personal attributes or attitudes. Even when
household formation is endogenous, the personal attributes that a member brings to
the household are typically treated as exogenous.
In our model, a particular personal attribute or attitude—which we call
“friendliness”—is a strategic choice variable of the individual. An obvious question is
how the strategic nature of friendliness and the chosen levels of friendliness affect the
stability of households and the allocation of resources within households. Conversely,
the question arises how the friendliness decisions are influenced by the availability
of resources and outside options to household members. To the extent that household
formation, resource allocation and personal attribute selections are interdependent
choices, the two questions cannot be answered separately.
The label “friendliness” stands for personal attribute choices like showing a friendly
or sour face; choosing a warm or cold tone; paying attention to or ignoring fellow
household members. More generally, “friendliness” can serve as a generic term for
any personal attribute that can be chosen at different levels; that exerts a positive
externality upon others which increases with the level; that is neither marketable nor
arrangeable by contract. Consequently, “friendliness” is not a standard commodity and
not subject to intra-household bargaining. In particular, it is not merely a household
produced commodity, a case already encompassed by the traditional multi-member
household model.
Friendliness, in the colloquial sense, towards other people increases their well-
being. Although friendliness is observable, it is in general not contractible, and is left
1 For prominent contributions, see Becker (1978, 1993), Browning et al. (1994), Browning and Chiappori
(1998), Chiappori (1988, 1992), Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), Lundberg and
Pollak (1994), among others. See also Gersbach and Haller (1999, 2001) and Haller (2000).
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fully to the discretion of each individual. There are important exceptions to that. For
instance, in many service occupations, the degree of friendliness towards customers is
part of the job description. Moreover, some people may have no choice in the matter.
They cannot help being friendly—or obnoxious—either by nature or by habit. Others
may be naturally friendly or naturally obnoxious, but are able to act out of character,
if they make a conscious effort.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the individuals of our model society can
effortlessly choose to be friendly or unfriendly. Friendliness is an endogenous choice.
We concentrate on affection shown in any two-person partnership that economically
constitutes a household. Individuals in those households often face a trade-off between
being nice, understanding and friendly to their partner, and an associated reduction of
bargaining power when it comes to the allocation of resources, or surplus in a broad
sense, within the household. This conflict arises from the fact that more often than not,
enhanced bargaining power derives from a stern and tough posture which sabotages
the attempt to appear friendly. We call this phenomenon the coupling condition:
Ceteris paribus, a friendlier attitude reduces a person’s bargaining power.
We will provide two justifications why greater friendliness can translate into lower
bargaining power in the next section. The coupling condition rules out the possibility
that a person grants the pleasure of friendly company to others and conveys the image of
a hard and determined negotiator at the same time. It also rules out the possibility that
friendliness is reciprocated, so that friendly behavior triggers a friendly response.2
Finally, it rules out emotional altruism: The partner’s direct benefit from friendly
behavior does not contribute to one’s own welfare. This is not to say that the assumed
away possibilities are unimportant or uninteresting. Here we isolate and explore just
one plausible and intriguing trade-off which, among other things, implies that the
distribution of bargaining power (regarding the allocation of commodities) within
households is endogenously determined.
Prima facie, it appears that the individuals in a society where the coupling condition
prevails have no reason to be friendly, since all they would get is a worse bargain within
their households. They are penalized for their friendliness. This is certainly correct
when a household is considered in isolation. However, competition for partners can
make these people friendly. We assume that the household structure, that is, the par-
tition of the population into households, is itself an endogenous outcome. A situation
in which a friendly household member is taken advantage of by an unfriendly partner
is unstable if the friendly person can find better opportunities outside this household,
either by going single or by teaming up with another partner. This suggests that in
general, a stable household structure requires friendly behavior by all parties.
The questions at hand suggest a bottom-up or inductive approach to model building,
in order to progressively study more sophisticated behavior and increasingly complex
2 Basu (1999) forwards the idea that while labor supply and consumption of household members are
determined by the balance of power within the household (and relative prices), the household’s balance
of power in turn depends on individually earned income, hence on individual labor supply (in addition to
relative prices). In a household equilibrium, both the allocation of resources and the balance of power within
the household are endogenized simultaneously. Basu (2006) pursues this idea further.
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scenarios as we move along. We begin with an instructive benchmark case: an isolated
household. We then turn to a very simple and amenable version of the model where
individuals compete for partners. We keep adding new features and develop richer
model variants as we proceed.
Absence of friendliness prevails in the isolated household analyzed in Sect. 2. In
Sect. 3, we introduce competition for partners and find that it does promote friendliness.
In a homogeneous population (with asexual partnerships), extreme friendliness can
result where each individual is matched with a partner and chooses the maximum level
of friendliness. We further find that in our context, affluence does not buy affection,
but can lead to withholding of affection by an affluent partner who can afford to do
so. While competition for partners tends to promote friendliness, it can also have a
destabilizing effect on households if there is an unmatched individual around.
In Sect. 4, we turn to sexual partnerships. In a society with an equal number of
heterosexual males and females, there is a continuum of equilibria which can be
ranked from the point of view of male welfare—and in reverse order from the female
perspective. If there is a majority of men, then the worst outcome for males (and the
best for females) occurs—and the opposite obtains, if there is a majority of women.
In Sect. 5, we offer concluding remarks and point out parallels between the coupling
condition and some theories from social psychology. We also relate our theoretical
results to recent empirical findings of Stevenson and Wolfers (2006).
2 The isolated household
We first consider an isolated and fixed household or partnership h where two persons,
i = 1, 2, choose their friendliness and then bargain over the utility allocation. One can
think of two persons who consider each other the only adequate partners. One can also
think of a snapshot of a society where separation (divorce) is not an option, so that
people are locked into their partnerships. Or one can simply regard this as a benchmark
case. We assume that there is a single private good and that the household is endowed
with the quantity ωh = 2 of that good. There is no need for trade with the outside
world, so the household is isolated both socially and economically. The welfare of
household member i depends on his consumption of the private good, xi ≥ 0 and
on the group externality g ji individual i receives. The value of g ji is chosen by the
other individual j , who selects a particular personality profile that is associated with
a certain level of friendliness. His preferences are represented by the utility function
Ui (xi , g ji ) = n xi + g ji .
We assume that g ji ∈ [0, g] with g > 0. While we assume that selecting g ji has no
direct costs or benefits for individual j , there are indirect costs in terms of bargai-
ning power. In particular, we assume that the utilitarian weight of the first individual,
denoted by α ∈ [0, 1], is a differentiable function f (g21, g12) with the following
properties:
(CC) f1 > 0, f (g, 0) = 1, f (g21, g12) = 1 − f (g12, g21)
where ft , t = 1, 2, denotes the partial derivative of f with respect to its t th argument.
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Two more properties follow: f2 < 0 and f (g, g) = 1/2.
The assumptions on f simply capture the coupling condition, the previously postu-
lated effect that a higher level of friendliness generated by an individual ceteris paribus
decreases his bargaining power, because he is more accommodating to his partner.
The function f can be justified at two levels. First, studies in social psychology
have consistently indicated that negotiators who develop positive attitudes and seek to
understand one another’s perspective have made greater concessions in negotiations
than others. We discuss these studies in the concluding section.
A second, more thorough justification can be derived from the contest literature. It is
inspired by the work of Che and Gale (1998, 2000).3 Suppose a two-person household
has to decide how to use its resources, and that the decision has to be taken within a
limited time-span. Each person has half of the time at its disposal, and has to decide
before the bargain starts how it wants to use its allotted time. In particular, a person
can use its time to try and understand the perspective and needs of the other person,
or to argue its own case. The first type of activity increases the friendliness, while
the latter increases the bargaining power. Specifically, suppose T is the time allotted
to each person and towni ∈ [0, T ] is the time spent by household member i on its
own case. The remaining time T − towni is used to increase the friendliness towards
the partner. Suppose that the function β(towni , t
own
j ) determines the bargaining power
while the level of friendliness of i towards the household partner j is given by a function
G(T −towni ). With suitable and plausible assumptions on β(·, ·) and G(·), we obtain the
function f . Namely, suppose G(·) is continuous and strictly increasing, with G(0) = 0
and G(T ) = g. Then picking any particular towni ∈ [0, T ] is equivalent to picking the
corresponding level of friendliness gi j = G(T − towni ) ∈ [0, g]. Taking gi j and g ji as
the decision variables, one obtains f (g ji , gi j ) = β
(
T − G−1(gi j ), T − G−1(g ji )
)
.
An example is G(τ ) = τ for τ ≥ 0 and
β(towni , t
own
j ) =
T + towni − townj
(T + towni − townj ) + (T + townj − towni )
= T + t
own
i − townj
2T
.
One obtains g = T and f (g21, g12) = (g + g21 − g12)/(2g), which is a “difference
form” bargaining function.4
The allocation in the household is determined by the following two-step procedure:
(i) Individuals choose their levels of friendliness, g12 and g21.
(ii) The household takes a collective decision based on utilitarian weights α =
f (g21, g12) for member 1 and 1 − α = 1 − f (g21, g12) = f (g12, g21) for
member 2.
We solve the household’s allocation problem by working backwards. Given g12 and
g21, the household solves the following maximization problem in the second step:
(Mh) : max
x1,x2
α · (n x1 + g21) + (1 − α) · (n x2 + g12)
s.t. x1 + x2 ≤ ωh
3 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this justification.
4 This is analogous to the “difference form” success function examined thoroughly in Che and Gale (2000).
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With ωh = 2, we immediately obtain x1 = 2α and x2 = 2 − 2α. We assume that 1
and 2 behave strategically in the first step, correctly anticipating the implied outcome
of the second step. Looking at a Nash equilibrium outcome of the overall allocation
process we obtain:
Proposition 1 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium with:
g12 = g21 = 0;
α = 1 − α = 1
2
;
U1 = U2 = 0.
The proposition follows immediately from the observation that given any level of
g21, the best reply of the first individual is to set g12 = 0 in order to maximize α, and
thus the utility from consumption. The reason is that g12 itself has no effect on the
group externality received by the first individual for given g21. It is obvious that the
equilibrium outcome is Pareto-inefficient since there is an allocation with
g12 = g21 = g,
α = 1 − a = 1
2
,
U1 = U2 = g.
But should one include α, which is not an argument of individual utility functions,
in the description of a Pareto-improvement? When considering alternative allocations,
ought households to be restricted to commodity allocations which are determined, via
the coupling condition, by the chosen levels of friendliness as we have presumed
so far? This restriction amounts to a concept of constrained Pareto-efficiency. In the
absence of the restriction, we shall use the term unconstrained Pareto-efficiency or
simply Pareto-efficiency.
The above Nash equilibrium outcome is not even constrained Pareto-efficient. Since
the creation of friendliness is costless and increases the utility of other individuals, it
is obvious that a constrained Pareto-efficient allocation requires that friendliness by at
least one individual be maximal. For otherwise, one can increase g12 and g21 so that α
and the resulting commodity allocation remain the same, but the positive externalities
increase. A constrained Pareto-efficient allocation does not require maximal friend-
liness of both individuals. Indeed, g12 = 0, g21 = g, x1 = 2, x2 = 0 constitutes
the best constrained Pareto-efficient allocation from the point of view of individual 1.
In contrast, unconstrained Pareto-efficiency does require maximal friendliness on the
part of both household members.
3 Competing partnerships: a simple social equilibrium model
Without competition, unfriendliness prevails in the isolated household. In this section,
we embed the previously isolated partnership in a society where different partnerships
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compete with each other. For that purpose, we amend and modify the previous model
as follows:
Let there be a population of N people, with N ≥ 3, represented by I ={1, 2, . . . , N }.
A household is a non-empty subset of the population. A household structure is a par-
tition of the population into households. We assume again that there is a single private
good. Household h, if it is formed, is endowed with the quantity ωh > 0 of that
good. We assume that forming a household of three or more persons creates enormous
negative group externalities and will never be considered. Therefore, we can restrict
ourselves to the formation of two- or one-person households. In a single-person hou-
sehold, an individual consumes his endowment. In a two-person household h = {i, j},
each individual, say i , chooses a level of friendliness gi j towards the other household
member, j . As before, his utility is Ui (xi , g ji ) = n xi + g ji , depending on his own
consumption of the private good, xi , and the friendliness received, g ji . The utilitarian
weights within household h are determined by a function f satisfying the analogue
of the coupling condition (CC).
In this and subsequent versions of the model, the household structure is not a fait
accompli. People are free to leave and will leave a household if they can get a better
deal elsewhere. A household structure is stable if no one has an incentive to leave
a household. Stability is an endogenous property. Whether a household structure is
stable depends on what happens in the corresponding households and what a member
can expect when he leaves his household. We consider an equilibrium of the following
multi-stage allocative process:
Stage 1: Partnerships are formed. A household structure P consisting of two-person
or one-person households emerges.
Stage 2: In two-person households h ∈ P, individuals decide on the group externa-
lities gi j , i, j ∈ h, i = j .
Stage 3: Collective consumption decisions in two-person households h ∈ P take
place, with the utilitarian weights in the analogue of problem Mh determined
by the choices made in stage 2.
Stage 4: Individuals leave to form new households.
An equilibrium of this process is a tuple (P; x; gi j , i, j ∈ h ∈ P, |h| = 2) in which
P is a household structure, x = (xi )i∈I is an allocation of the private consumption
good and the gi j are levels of friendliness in two-person households such that
• Given P and the chosen group externalities gi j , x is the allocation resulting from
stage 3 of the process and therefore feasible, i.e.
∑
i∈h xi = ωh ∀h.• No individual has an incentive to leave a two-person household and go single,
consuming his own endowment.
• No two individuals in different partnerships, say i ∈ h and k ∈ h′, have an incentive
to offer each other group externalities gik and gki such that both individuals would
be (strictly) better off in the newly created household {i, k}.
• No member of a two-person household can change the group externality decision
in stage 2 and achieve a higher utility without the partner feeling compelled to
leave in stage 4.
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Notice that we apply our fundamental postulate that household members cannot
decouple friendliness and bargaining power to both actual and potential households.
Notice further that the employed equilibrium concept is static.
3.1 An extremely friendly society
We assume N = 2n with n ≥ 2 and further y > 0 such that for each household h,
ωh = |h|·y. In this society, fierce competition for partners leads people to be extremely
friendly to their partners: everybody receives the maximal level of friendliness, g. More
precisely, we obtain:
Proposition 2 Up to permutation of individuals, there exists a unique equilibrium:
• P = {h1, . . . , hn} where hν = {2ν − 1, 2ν} for ν = 1, . . . , n;
• gi j = g, ∀i, j ∈ h ∈ P, i = j ;
• xi = y, ∀i ∈ I .
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Observe that the equilibrium of this extremely friendly society is Pareto-efficient.
However, this welfare conclusion is not robust. Whereas competition for partners tends
to enhance equilibrium welfare, it does not always lead to Pareto-efficient equilibrium
outcomes, in some cases not even to constrained Pareto-efficient ones. The latter
outcome occurs in the next subsection when there are two affluent and four normally
endowed individuals.
3.2 Affluence and affection
The exchange of wealth for care or affection has been examined in the context of
intergenerational transfers, notably bequests. Here we explore the possibility of this
kind of exchange between spouses or partners belonging to the same generation. We
find that in our context, affluence does not buy affection, but can cause the withholding
of affection by an affluent partner.
We modify the model from the previous section. We assume again that N is even.
But now there are two types of individuals, normally endowed individuals and affluent
individuals. Normally endowed individuals have an individual endowment of ωi =
y > 0 of the consumption good. We assume that there are at least four more of them
than there are affluent individuals. Moreover, there exists a number Y > y so that every
affluent individual a has an individual endowment ωa = Y of the consumption good.
For a household h, ωh = ∑i∈h ωi . For convenience, let us further assume g ≥ n 2.
One affluent person
Let a denote the affluent individual. In an equilibrium, individual a will be paired
with some normally endowed individual, say b. The rest of the society forms 2-person
households consisting of normally endowed individuals. We construct the equilibrium
in several steps.
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• Step 1: Since there are at least two households with normally endowed individuals,
we can apply the uniqueness argument of Proposition 2 to this subpopulation
and find that in equilibrium, everybody must choose g in those households, with
resulting utility n y + g.
• Step 2: We claim that the equilibrium choice in household {a, b} is gba = g,
whereas gab satisfies
gab + n [ f (gab, g) · (y + Y )] = n y + g (1)
This makes individual b indifferent between being in this household and forming
a household with another normally endowed individual. Let us check that, indeed,
this is the equilibrium choice. First, if b chose less than g, individual a would have
an incentive to form another partnership. Second, an individual i from another
household would not want to form a new household with a. In order to lure a away
from b, a’s utility would have to increase, which is only possible if i’s utility falls.
Similarly, i cannot lure away b from a. Finally, given gba = g, Eq. (1) characterizes
a’s best choice subject to the constraint that b not be driven away.
• Step 3: It remains to be verified that a does not prefer to remain single. This is the
case if, and only if,
n[(1 − f (gab, g)) · (y + Y )] + g ≥ n Y
or, equivalently,
n(1 − f (gab, g)) + g ≥ n(Y/(y + Y )).
Since 1 − f (gab, g) > 1/2 and g ≥ n 2, the left-hand side is positive, while the
right-hand side is negative. Hence the inequality holds.
Steps 1–3 establish the existence of the equilibrium. As any equilibrium has to fulfill
the conditions in Steps 1–3, uniqueness is guaranteed as well. We conclude that in this
equilibrium, affluence does not buy affection, but rather induces the affluent person to
show less than maximal affection. The affluent individual fares better than when being
single, in an isolated household or normally endowed. But interestingly enough, the
lack of other affluent people does not give her an added competitive advantage. This
is expressed in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider a society A with one affluent individual a and 2n −1 normally
endowed individuals. Consider an alternative society B in which individual a and all
other individuals are affluent. Then, individual a is better off in society B.
Proof of Corollary 1 The preceding analysis has established a unique equilibrium for
society A. The utility of individual a is given by
n[(1 − f (gab, g)) · (y + Y )] + g. (2)
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Proposition 2 yields a unique equilibrium for society B by setting y = Y , in which
individual a obtains the utility nY + g. Hence, individual a is better off in society B
if and only if
n Y + g > n[(1 − f (gab, g)) · (y + Y )] + g (3)
which reduces to
f (gab, g) > y/(y + Y ). (4)
From condition (1) and g > gab, we obtain n [ f (gab, g) · (y + Y )] > ny, which is
equivalent to condition (4). Thus, (3) holds. This proves the corollary. unionsq
Two affluent persons
Let a and c denote the two affluent individuals. Again, only 2-person households
are formed in equilibrium and at least two of those households consist entirely of
normally endowed individuals. Therefore, the uniqueness argument of Proposition 2
applies once more: The members of two-person households composed of normally
endowed individuals all choose g. Moreover, the household {a, c} is formed. For
suppose not. Then a is in a household with a normally endowed individual b. But the
maximal utility a can obtain in this household is implicitly given by (1). An analogous
statement holds for c. But a and c could form a new household and both choose g,
making both better off—as shown in the proof of Corollary 1. This demonstrates that
only the formation of household {a, c} is compatible with equilibrium. This does not
mean, however, that both affluent individuals actually choose g in equilibrium. Each
will drive down the other’s utility to the maximal level they can obtain when paired
with a normally endowed individual. Evidently, this constitutes an equilibrium. Thus,
the two affluent individuals find each other, but neither one gains or loses from the
other’s presence. Incidentally, this constitutes an example where there is competition
for partners, but the equilibrium outcome fails to be constrained Pareto-efficient.
Three affluent persons
By the same reasoning as in the case of two affluent persons, equilibrium requires the
following. Only two-person households form. Two of the affluent individuals form
a two-person household. All normally endowed individuals choose g. All affluent
individuals attain the same utility, namely the maximal utility they can achieve when
paired with a normally endowed individual. However, such a constellation does not
constitute an equilibrium. For one affluent individual, say a, is paired with a normally
endowed individual, say b, and as we have already argued, such a household is bound to
break up. Therefore, no equilibrium and, consequently, no stable household structure
exists.
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Four affluent persons
By the previous arguments, only two-person households form in equilibrium. Every
mixed household will break up. Considering the individuals of the same type separa-
tely, we can conclude from the former analysis of the extremely friendly society that
each individual has to choose g in equilibrium and that this constitutes an equilibrium
for each of the two sub-populations. By the argument in the proof of Corollary 1, no
two individuals of different type can both benefit from breaking up their partnerships
and forming a mixed household. Hence, an equilibrium exists and equilibrium is cha-
racterized by the following two properties. Each individual is paired with an individual
of the same type. Each individual chooses the maximal level of friendliness. Thus an
extremely friendly society emerges.
More than four affluent persons
With an odd number of affluent persons, instability prevails. With an even number of
affluent persons, an extremely friendly society results.
3.3 The destabilizing effect of free agents
As in Subsect. 3.1, let there be an ex ante homogeneous population. But now let
N = 2n + 1 with n ≥ 1. Then the equilibrium still requires that as many two-person
households as possible are formed. In a two-person household, it is impossible for the
utility of both household members to exceed n y + g. Further, because of the odd
number of individuals, there always remains one free agent i , an individual who is
currently single. Now take any two-person household and pick a member j of this
household whose utility does not exceed n y + g. Then i and j can form a new
household and choose gi j = g and g ji = g −  with  > 0 being sufficiently small
so that both are better off. This shows that any household structure that conceivably
might emerge in equilibrium is destabilized by the presence of one free agent. Thus,
equilibrium does not exist.
4 Sexual partnerships
So far we have dealt with a model of a society where sex and sexual orientation do not
matter for the formation of households. We now consider the case where individuals
are distinguished by sex and sexual orientation. Individuals are identical in all other
respects, with the characteristics introduced in Subsect. 3.1. But in addition to impeding
the formation of households with more than two members, we rule out two-person
households where one person’s sex does not match the other’s sexual orientation. It
turns out that this additional assumption makes a significant difference.
To describe equilibrium outcomes for a heterosexual population, we introduce a
threshold level of friendliness g ∈ (0, g) given by
g + n[ f (g, g) · y] = n y
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or g + n f (g, g) = 0. This threshold g is the level of friendliness of the other
household member, who makes an individual choosing g indifferent between staying
in the household or going single. We begin with a society where the numbers of males
and females match.
Proposition 3 Let N = 2n, with n ≥ 2, n males and n females. Then for any gˆ ∈
[g, g], the following constitutes an equilibrium:
• The household structure P consists of two-person households each composed of a
male and a female.
• All males choose gˆ and all females choose g.
• The commodity allocation in each two-person household h is determined by solving
Mh.
The corresponding outcome with the respective role of males and females reversed
also constitutes an equilibrium.
The proof of the proposition is straightforward. It can be shown further that all
equilibria are of the form given in the proposition; see Gersbach and Haller (2005,
Corollary 1). This result suggests that the current society may settle for one of many
conventions favoring one or the other sex. This finding is quite different from what
we found in Proposition 2 for the extremely friendly society, a homogeneous asexual
population with an even number of people. Moreover, we obtained instability for a
homogeneous asexual population with an odd number of people, which is not the case
here:
Proposition 4 Let there be m males and n females. If there is a majority of males,
m > n ≥ 1, or a majority of females, n > m ≥ 1, then an equilibrium exists and the
following properties hold:
• Each member of the minority forms a two-person household with a member of the
majority. The remaining members of the majority form one-person households.
• Minority members choose g and majority members choose g.
• The commodity allocation in each two-person household h is determined by solving
Mh.
Again, the proof is straightforward. The minority benefits from the fact that majority
members are pitted against each other in their quest for partners.
5 Conclusion
Household formation is an integral part of economic and social activities. The general
equilibrium perspective leads to very different conclusions about the degrees of friend-
liness prevailing in a society than in an isolated household. In the extended version
Gersbach and Haller (2005), we draw the parallels and divides between our model and
models of multilateral bargaining, matching and assignment games.
One of our main findings suggests that an exit option causes individuals to behave
less badly to one other. Such a finding has some empirical support. Examining state
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panel data, Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) “find a striking decline in female suicide
and domestic violence rates arising from the advent of unilateral divorce. Total female
suicide declined by around 20% in states that adopted unilateral divorce. There is
no discernable effect on male suicide.” The data suggest an asymmetry with respect
to male and female suicide. One explanation could be that an unbearable domestic
situation is less of a factor for male than female suicide. An alternative explanation
could be that the absence of unilateral divorce constitutes less of a barrier to exit for
males than for females. Notice that our model yields asymmetric equilibrium outcomes
(social conventions) with equal numbers of males and females.
As regards the significant behavioral response to the change of divorce laws, one
might suspect that behavior in persisting marriages did not actually change, that unsa-
tisfied spouses simply took the escape route of unilateral divorce. However, this does
not seem to be the case. Stevenson and Wolfers conclude: “Unilateral divorce chan-
ged the bargaining power in marriages, and therefore impacted many marriages—not
simply the extra few divorces enabled by unilateral divorce.” This is consistent with
our finding that exit options increase the degree of friendliness in households.
Lest the reader considers our theoretical result (that an exit option can improve
welfare) unsurprising, let us hasten to observe that added outside options for house-
hold members need not necessarily increase equilibrium welfare. In an economy with
several tradeable commodities, the value of an outside option may depend on relative
prices. In Gersbach and Haller (2000) we show the following possibility:5 Without
the particular outside option, there can be two equilibria one of which weakly Pareto-
dominates the other one. When the outside option is introduced, its high value to some
individuals in the Pareto-dominant equilibrium destabilizes certain households. As
a consequence, the outside option leads to the elimination of the better equilibrium
while the Pareto-inferior equilibrium continues to exist.
A key assumption for our analysis is the coupling condition which has parallels in
social psychology. Within interdependence theory, social value orientations have been
found to affect individuals’ behavior in negotiations (e.g. De Dreu and Van Lange
1995; O’Connor and Carnevale 1997; De Dreu et al. 2000). Prosocial negotiators who
develop positive attitudes and seek to understand one another’s perspective have placed
lower demands and made greater concessions in negotiations than others. Prosocial
behavior can be interpreted as choosing a high level of friendliness (strategically
prosocial) or exhibiting emotional concern for others (genuinely prosocial). Others
have pointed out that negotiators try to build a positive climate in order to increase the
joint and individual surplus (Lewicki et al. 1994). A further, somewhat remote parallel
is the perception of justice in terms of entitlement beliefs (see the survey of Mikula
and Wenzel 2000). Entitlement beliefs are categorizations about what an individual
and others deserve or are entitled to. Entitlement beliefs can influence resistance and
concession making in negotiations, because the violation of somebody’s entitlement
constitutes an incident of perceived injustice. A higher level of friendliness could tend
to increase the entitlement beliefs of the partner, and thus could increase his demands
for concessions. This would provide a foundation for the coupling condition.
5 In Gersbach and Haller (2000) as in the rest of the literature, personal attributes are assumed exogenous.
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While we think that the strategic role of the coupling condition captures some
important aspects of household behavior, it would be unwise to neglect other stabili-
zing elements. Future research should aim at combining affection and affluence with
other forces which bring people into durable relationships, like trust and commitment
to support one another, insurance, and caring for children and for each other. A dyna-
mic approach could explicitly deal with the formation as well as the dissolution of
households and allow a thorough analysis of situations where a static equilibrium fails
to exist.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 We have to show existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Existence. We show that the given tuple (P; x; gi j , i, j ∈h ∈P, |h| = 2) is indeed an
equilibrium. The consumption allocation x = (xi )i∈I is feasible and (x2ν−1, x2ν)
maximizes the partnership welfare function of household hν, ν = 1, . . . , n. For
instance, consider partnership h1, which solves
max
x1,x2
= f (g12, g21) · (ln x1 + g21) + (1 − f (g12, g21)) · (ln x2 + g12)
s.t. x1 + x2 = 2y.
Since g12 = g21 = g we have f (g12, g21) = 1/2 and therefore x1 = x2 = y.
Nobody can leave a partnership and benefit relative to the status quo: If an individual
goes single, he foregoes the positive group externality. If two individuals form a new
partnership and each chooses g, neither one gains; if one of them chooses less than g,
at least one of them loses. Finally, if in an existing household, {i, j}, one member, say
i , tried to improve his bargaining power by choosing gˆi j < g, he would induce his
partner j to leave and form a new partnership with some k ∈ {i, j} where they choose,
for instance, g jk = g and gkj = (gˆi j + g)/2. Hence all the equilibrium conditions are
met.
Uniqueness. Consider first a household structure where (at least) two individuals,
say 1 and 2, remain single. Then they can do better by forming h1 and choosing
g12 = g21 = g. Hence, all individuals have a partner in equilibrium.
Suppose second that P = {h1, . . . , hn} is the prevailing household structure, but
not everybody chooses gi j = g. Let g∗ denote the highest choice made and I ∗ denote
the set of individuals who made this choice.
If I ∗ = I , then gi j = g∗ < g for all i j and individuals 2 and 3 can both benefit
from forming a new household and choosing g23 = g32 = g.
If I ∗ = I , we distinguish two cases.
Case 1 At least one member of I ∗ is paired with a member of I ∗, say g12 = g21 = g∗.
Then there exists at least one other household, say h2, with a member not belonging to
I ∗. Without loss of generality, let g34 = min{g34, g43} < g∗. Then individuals 1 and
4 can both benefit from forming a new household and choosing g41 = g, g14 = g − ,
with  > 0 sufficiently small.
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Case 2 No member of I ∗ is paired with a member of I ∗. If |I ∗| ≥ 2, then two members
of i and j of I ∗ can form a new partnership, set gi j = g ji = g and both be better off.
If |I ∗| = 1, I ∗ = {k}, then there exists a household, say h1, none of whose members
belongs to I ∗. Without loss of generality, let g12 ≤ g21 < g∗. Then individuals 2 and
k can both benefit from forming a new partnership and choosing g2k = gk2 = g.
We have shown that there is always a pair of individuals who can benefit from
forming a new partnership if gi j = g does not hold for some gi j . Hence gi j = g for
all i j has to hold in equilibrium. This completes the proof. unionsq
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